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“[V]accine nationalism . . . should serve as a reality check for the status of global
health cooperation in the twenty-first century.”
Is There a Cure for Vaccine Nationalism?
ANA SANTOS RUTSCHMAN
T
he expression “vaccine nationalism” made
headlines throughout 2020, from the Wall
Street Journal to National Public Radio. It
became a regular feature of public and scholarly
debates during the COVID-19 pandemic, coloring
discussions about the broader topics of public–
private scientific collaboration and the role of
international organizations in public health.
In the context of a vaccine race, nationalism
appears in the act of reserving millions of doses
of new vaccines for domestic use during a trans-
national public health crisis. For over a decade,
vaccine nationalism has been associated with the
use of contractual agreements, usually between
a national government and one or more pharma-
ceutical companies engaged in late-stage develop-
ment and production of leading vaccine
candidates. Because these agreements are typi-
cally struck well before vaccines are fully licensed,
they are known as advance market commitments
or preproduction agreements.
An important feature of advance commitments
is that they can be deployed as incentives to
encourage investments in traditionally under-
funded areas in global public health. By signaling
relatively robust levels of demand for a drug or
vaccine, albeit conditioned on regulatory autho-
rization or approval, these agreements help
attract private-sector manufacturers that might
otherwise choose to invest their time and re-
sources in more profitable areas of scientific
research and development (R&D).
Since most emerging infectious diseases histor-
ically have circulated in the global South, most
vaccines and drugs to counter them have long
been associated with underfunded or neglected
disease-control efforts, which the World Health
Organization (WHO) has characterized as lacking
in “R&D preparedness.” Despite these market-
driven dynamics, organizations like GAVI,
a Geneva-based vaccine procurement alliance,
have successfully resorted to advance commit-
ments in the past to drum up private- and
public-sector interest in the development of vac-
cines for low-income populations.
In 2009, for instance, GAVI’s advance commit-
ment to buy pneumococcal vaccines was instru-
mental in bringing them to children in 60
countries across the global South. Without such
a commitment, it is estimated that these vaccines
would not have been made available in low-
income countries until 10 to 15 years after being
introduced in high-income countries.
Although advance commitments may be desir-
able as a financing and risk-management mecha-
nism, heavy reliance on them can become
problematic during large-scale public health
crises—all the more so if powerful players exert
a disproportionate influence on the transnational
allocation of health goods, especially those that
have to be developed from scratch, as is the case
with vaccines targeting a new pathogen. COVID-19
was officially declared a pandemic in March 2020.
By midsummer, high-income countries account-
ing for just 13 percent of the global population
had placed orders for more than half of the pro-
jected available doses in the first batches of COVID-
19 vaccines.
Aside from the lopsided demographic and geo-
graphic distribution of emerging vaccines, this pri-
oritized channeling of vaccine doses to the global
North is hard to square with public health frame-
works and epidemiological data that show COVID-
19 spreading widely across the global South,
imposing associated burdens on individuals, com-
munities, and health systems.
By late August 2020, high-income countries had
placed orders for over 2 billion vaccine doses,
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a number that almost certainly exceeds the initial
manufacturing capacity at the global level for the
first batches of a fully licensed COVID-19 vaccine or
vaccines. The United Kingdom was the largest per
capita buyer of COVID-19 vaccines in the world,
pre-ordering 340 million doses, or five doses per
citizen. The United States had pre-ordered 800
million doses, with an option to purchase an addi-
tional 1 billion.
Most low-income countries had not entered
into direct agreements with pharmaceutical com-
panies, with the exception of some of the largest
economies in the global South, such as Brazil. This
divergence is why vaccine nationalism has been
criticized by public health–oriented institutions
like the WHO as well as commentators concerned
about equitable distribution of vaccines and other
emerging health goods needed in the response to
the pandemic.
THE SWINE FLU RACE
Contractual mechanisms that skew the alloca-
tion of emerging vaccines are not a new phenom-
enon. COVID-19 merely
amplified geoeconomic strate-
gies that were already at play
during a previous global pan-
demic triggered by an out-
break of a novel H1N1
influenza virus in 2009—often
referred to as the swine flu
pandemic.
The virus was first detected in April 2009 in the
United States, though later studies suggested it
might have originated in Mexico. By June it had
spread across the United States, reaching all 50
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
the US Virgin Islands, as well as over other 60
countries. This was the first global flu pandemic
since 1968 (the H3N2 pandemic), and the second
since the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which re-
mains the deadliest on record.
Given the quick spread of the disease and the
toll it took on populations under the age of 65,
scientists and public health authorities initially
feared that the H1N1 pandemic would place an
enormous burden on public health systems. Early
in the outbreak, it was recognized that existing
seasonal flu vaccines did not offer protection
against the novel pathogen. Developing new vac-
cines was widely perceived as a critical response.
R&D proceeded in a compressed schedule amid
uncertainty about the length and likely effects of
the outbreak—circumstances similar to those in
the early stages of the COVID-19 vaccine race.
Even before the WHO declared H1N1 a pandemic
on June 11, 2009—and before the decision to ini-
tiate large-scale production of vaccines targeting
the novel pathogen—several high-income coun-
tries pre-ordered doses from pharmaceutical com-
panies known for producing flu vaccines,
including Sanofi Pasteur, GlaxoSmithKline, and
Novartis. By early May 2009, it was reported that
the United States had already placed advance
orders that would enable it to buy over 600 million
doses of vaccine, based on calculations that it
would be necessary to administer two doses per
person. Several European countries had also
entered into contractual agreements to reserve
vaccine doses, though order volumes were not
disclosed.
At the time, the projected global capacity to man-
ufacture a vaccine during a pandemic was around
two billion doses at best; some commentators sug-
gested that a more realistic projection would be
closer to one billion doses. Within this range,
advance commitments involv-
ing the United States alone
would have exhausted 30 to




A small number of coun-
tries, mostly in the global North, had availed them-
selves of a commonly used legal instrument,
a bilateral contract, to secure the earliest possible
access to emerging vaccines, leaving low-income
countries in the likely position of having very lim-
ited, if any, access to the first batches. However,
manufacturing capacity and global South–North
distribution dynamics were never really put to the
test. The H1N1 pandemic began to wane sooner
than originally expected, and the most extreme,
catastrophic scenarios never came to pass. And
clinical trials showed that a single dose of vaccine
was likely protective, reducing the demand from
each country.
By the time the US Food and Drug Administra-
tion approved four vaccines on September 15,
2009, vaccination strategies were much less urgent
in high-income countries than they had been just
a few months earlier. The European Medicines
Agency issued a recommendation favoring
approval a few weeks later. On September 18, sev-
eral countries that had pre-ordered vaccines—
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There is no binding mechanism
that would shift the dominant
negotiating paradigm.
mostly high-income ones—pledged to donate
doses to low-income countries.
These donations were portrayed as a much-
needed goodwill gesture in a context of relative
vaccine scarcity. The WHO issued a written state-
ment “applauding” the pledge as a “commitment
to fairness” on the part of participating
countries—the United States, the United King-
dom, Italy, France, Norway, Switzerland, Austra-
lia, New Zealand, and Brazil. Yet the arc of the
2009 flu pandemic left unanswered the most fun-
damental questions about North–South relation-
ships in situations in which there is sustained
global demand for scarce health goods.
These questions have resurfaced during the cor-
onavirus pandemic. Unlike the 2009 H1N1 vaccine
pursuit, COVID-19 has set off a crowded race. Over
200 vaccine R&D projects were still formally ongo-
ing at the time of this writing, though the number
of frontrunners is currently in the single digits and
the market is unlikely to accommodate many more
manufacturers.
The impact of COVID-19 has also been far more
extensive than that of the 2009 pandemic. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have
calculated that there were 60.8 million cases of
H1N1 in the United States between April 2009 and
April 2010, resulting in an estimated 274,304
hospitalizations and 12,469 deaths. In contrast,
with the COVID-19 pandemic still unfolding, by
late September 2020 the United States had
already recorded over 200,000 deaths among
some 7 million cases.
Despite these and other material differences
between the two pandemics, the COVID-19 vaccine
race has been partly shaped by forces that replicate
and magnify the transnational dynamics that were
already seen in 2009. A group of wealthier players
is able to guarantee de facto priority access to an
emerging health good through the use of a lawful
and commonly used contractual mechanism. By
skewing the global distribution of vaccines, these
players contribute to widening the divide between
high-income and low-income countries, further
complicating transnational responses to a global-
ized public health crisis.
THE COVAX CHALLENGE
While the COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated
these long-standing inequities in global public
health, it has also shed some light on potential
short- and long-term fixes for imbalances in vac-
cine distribution. In an attempt to bridge the
existing gulf between populations in high- and
low-income countries, multi-institutional re-
sponses to the COVID-19 pandemic have adopted
the advance commitment model as a way to tem-
porarily coordinate the global allocation of emerg-
ing vaccines. This effort has been carried out by
means of a newly created mechanism, the COVID-19
Vaccine Global Access Facility (COVAX).
COVAX is part of a set of initiatives undertaken
by several international public health organiza-
tions with the goal of speeding up both the devel-
opment and the equitable distribution of health
goods necessary to hasten the end of the pan-
demic. These initiatives came together under the
umbrella of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT)
Accelerator, a collaborative platform sponsored
by the WHO, the World Bank, the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the
Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust, GAVI, the
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovation
(CEPI), the Foundation for Innovative New Diag-
nostics, and Unitaid.
The ACT Accelerator is based on four pillars:
diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines, and health
systems. COVAX, part of the vaccines pillar, is
coordinated by the WHO, GAVI, and CEPI, a public–
private partnership for product development that
was established in 2017 to promote investment in
vaccines targeting emerging infectious diseases.
The initial goal of COVAX is to ensure the equita-
ble distribution of 2 billion doses of COVID-19
vaccines by the end of 2021, an amount deemed
sufficient to protect the populations at highest
risk within all the countries that have opted into
the facility.
The facility is designed to procure vaccines
before they receive regulatory approval on behalf
of countries that elect to join COVAX. Within weeks
of the announcement of the facility’s establish-
ment, over 150 countries had expressed interest
in joining. Participation is conditioned on a pay-
ment in exchange for a predetermined number of
doses as vaccines become available, proportional
to each country’s population.
COVAX has committed to procuring enough vac-
cine doses to cover at least 20 percent of the pop-
ulation of participating countries. The process will
start with an initial tranche of doses sufficient to
cover 3 percent of the population in each country.
That should enable countries to vaccinate most of
their highest-risk groups, such as frontline health
care workers. After the 20 percent threshold is
reached, follow-up distribution of vaccines may
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be subject to weighted allocation based on each
country’s public health vulnerabilities if demand
outstrips the vaccine supply.
COVAX mimics GAVI’s strategy for obtaining
vaccine doses for distribution in low-income
countries, even though it is open to both lower-
and higher-income countries. COVAX relies on
high-volume purchasing to lower the price of vac-
cines—by placing larger orders than most individ-
ual countries, especially lower-income ones,
would ordinarily be able to. It also functions as
a risk-sharing mechanism by negotiating advance
commitments with multiple pharmaceutical com-
panies, thus guaranteeing vaccine portfolio diver-
sification. Only the wealthiest countries in the
global North have traditionally been in a position
to accomplish that, through individual negotia-
tions with multiple drugmakers. COVAX provides
an incentive for these companies to engage in
large-scale manufacturing of doses, without any
assurance that they will receive regulatory
approval, by creating a contract-based market for
emerging vaccines.
The ongoing COVAX experi-
ment directly counters the
exclusionary ethos of bilater-
alism, which allows only
countries with certain levels
of economic and negotiating
capacity to take part in the ear-
liest rounds of allocation of
a globally needed health good. COVAX also offers
an encouraging example of swift design and im-
plementation of transnational solutions to some of
the problems posed by major public health crises.
After COVAX was launched in May 2020, it rolled
out a financing instrument, the Advance Market
Commitment (AMC), in June to enable the partic-
ipation of lower- and middle-income countries.
The AMC, modeled after GAVI’s own procurement
mechanisms, is used to fund vaccine pre-orders
from different manufacturers. When a vaccine is
licensed and approved by the WHO, those funds are
used to pay for doses to be distributed among par-
ticipating countries.
By late September, 92 lower-income countries
and 54 higher-income countries had officially
joined COVAX, with 38 more expected to follow
suit. Collectively, the countries that decided to
participate within this compressed time frame rep-
resent nearly two-thirds of the global population.
From a distributive justice perspective, these
efforts to pool resources and coordinate the
distribution of emerging vaccines in a global
framework are an improvement over siloed,
nationalistic approaches. Nevertheless, they are
necessarily limited in scope and corrective force.
COVAX describes its overall mission as promoting
the distribution of vaccines in ways that are “fair.”
But can a remedial intervention halfway through
a pandemic truly infuse fairness into a process that
has deep roots in systemic inequality and in modes
of biomedical innovation heavily dependent on
noncollaborative approaches?
FLAWED BLUEPRINT?
Although initiatives like COVAX hint at the pos-
sibility of at least some centralization and coordi-
nation of vaccine acquisition and distribution,
they must operate in the long shadow of contrac-
tual bilateralism. A closer look at the structure of
COVAX illustrates the immediate shortcomings of
corrective interventions taking place amidst a pan-
demic or similarly disruptive international crises.
Countries brought together under the aegis of
equitable access to vaccines
are yet again treated differ-
ently according to their eco-
nomic status. Higher-income
countries are able to finance
their share of advance market
commitments, whereas many
lower-income countries can-
not afford to do so. The AMC
financing mechanism was created to enable the
latter to buy their way into COVAX. Countries with
a gross national income per capita under $4,000
(currently there are 92), as well as countries eligi-
ble through the World Bank’s International Devel-
opment Association, may take advantage of the
AMC and receive funding to meet their financial
obligations under COVAX.
Whether a country joins COVAX through the
self-funded or the assisted funding pathway has
important ramifications. COVAX’s vaccine alloca-
tion policy, released in June 2020, puts no restric-
tions on the ability of self-funded countries to
enter into parallel bilateral vaccine purchase
agreements. By contrast, if a country receiving
financial assistance enters into bilateral agree-
ments for doses covering 20 percent of its popula-
tion, it will not receive access to its COVAX share
until all other participating countries have taken
their 20 percent shares.
An economically defined distinction that fur-
ther curtails the ability of less affluent countries
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Skewing the global distribution
of vaccines widens the divide
between high-income and
low-income countries.
to negotiate access to more vaccine doses makes
little sense. It was justified by the COVAX leader-
ship as necessary in light of geopolitical and time
constraints. Yet it is hard to reconcile with the
principles of proportionality and fairness by which
the facility is supposed to be guided.
Current COVAX policies recommend but do
not require that self-funded countries—the ones
making ample use of parallel bilateral negotia-
tions—donate excess doses of COVID-19 vaccines.
Technically, if a higher-income country were to
achieve herd immunity or vaccinate all the people
who need protection, it could sit on its stockpiles
indefinitely. It might elect to donate doses anyway,
motivated by altruism or public relations, but this
loophole nonetheless is at odds with COVAX’s goals
of distributive justice and fairness.
These shortcomings do not detract from the
achievement of such a large multilateral network
of heterogeneous players, including international
organizations, private-sector firms, and govern-
ments, in coming together so quickly to mitigate
the hoarding effects of vaccine nationalism. But
they do undermine the guiding principles that
brought these players together.
COVAX coexists with bilateral approaches to vac-
cine acquisition, which high-income countries still
pursue as their primary mode of procurement in
response to pandemics. That pathway is limited or
unavailable for most lower-income countries. Even
if COVAX were to evolve into a permanent fixture in
the international public health apparatus, there is
no legal or otherwise binding mechanism that
would shift the dominant negotiating paradigm
from contractual bilateralism to a largely central-
ized vaccine procurement system to prevent or
respond to epidemics and pandemics. That would
require nothing short of a fundamental change in
the rapport between the global North and South.
Signs that these imbalances are likely to persist
in the post–COVID-19 world were observable dur-
ing the embryonic stages of COVAX, when some of
the largest powers—the United States, China, and
Russia—declined to join the facility. China even-
tually joined in October 2020. At the time of this
writing, India, which is home to the largest vac-
cine manufacturer in the world by volume, the
Serum Institute, was still pondering whether to
join COVAX.
By late September 2020, COVAX had raised $700
million in funding, well short of its initial goal of
$2 billion by the end of the year. The gap led some
commentators to question the long-term financial
stability of any such organization that pools re-
sources to procure vaccines.
COVAX could be improved in the short term
through relatively minor corrections to the alloca-
tive framework currently in use. But these pro-
blems raise concerns about the COVAX model as
a blueprint for future, possibly permanent struc-
tures designed to counter nationalistic tendencies
in vaccine acquisition and distribution.
REALITY CHECK
Contractual bilateralism and global efforts to
procure health goods will likely coexist in future
epidemics and pandemics. These overlapping but
also potentially exclusionary dynamics turn the
problem of allocating emerging vaccines into
a deadly serious game that must be played across
different chessboards.
This divided approach meshes poorly with the
borderless ways in which pathogens propagate in
an increasingly globalized world. It also contra-
dicts public health precepts for effective pandemic
preparedness and response. As legal scholar Law-
rence Gostin points out in his 2014 book Global
Health Law, “globalized health hazards” under-
score the “need for collective global action.”
Perhaps the main problem with ad hoc solutions
to dilemmas of allocating public health goods is
that these plans tend to emerge late, as an emer-
gency unfolds. It will be difficult to achieve equi-
table allocation across the global South–North
divide if policymakers do not address the larger
framework that determines how pandemic and epi-
demic health goods are produced in the first place.
Vaccine nationalism and the contractual bilat-
eralism that fuels it are twin embodiments of a sys-
temically siloed approach to the production of
health goods. While scientific endeavors remain
intrinsically collaborative and borderless, R&D
processes for vaccine development have become
antithetical to the scientific ideals of communality
and disinterestedness. As with virtually every
other type of emerging health technology, new
vaccines produced from the mid-twentieth cen-
tury onward are protected by patents and often
regarded more as commodities than as goods that
should be made universally available to promote
public health.
Funding decisions in pre-pandemic periods
tend to fail to account for prospective public
health value, focusing more often on market-
based considerations. Financing and coordination
of R&D geared toward the prevention and
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management of future public health crises are
peripheral in the agendas of commercial and insti-
tutional players indispensable to the development
and production of these goods. By the time a need
materializes for a specific vaccine or other pandemic
health needs, such as therapeutics or ventilator
parts, the ensuing race usually follows the proprie-
tary modes of innovation that have come to domi-
nate mainstream drug and vaccine development.
Vaccine nationalism—or any other nationalistic
approach to the allocation of health goods needed
transnationally—is an extension of siloed and
competition-driven frameworks in the pharma-
ceutical industry. The manifestations of vaccine
nationalism in recent pandemics should serve as
a reality check for the status of global health coop-
eration in the twenty-first century, as well as the
wobbly post–World War II institutional architec-
ture of global health.
During the early stages of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the Trump administration chose to pursue
isolationism as its default, multipurpose policy,
complemented by bilateralism. The incoming
Biden administration seems poised to reverse
some of the recent forms of isolationism adopted
by the United States, including its withdrawal
from the WHO. It also may be more inclined to
participate in more collaborative approaches,
such as those adopted by other countries, inter-
national organizations, and various private, pub-
lic, and public–private actors during the COVID-19
pandemic. These efforts are far from perfect. But
they mark the first step toward incrementally bet-
ter collaborations. &
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